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Abstract
This paper presents a model of stock market equilibrium with a ﬁnite number of corporations
and studies its normative properties. Each ﬁrm is run by a manager whose eﬀort is unobservable
and inﬂuences the probabilities of the ﬁrm’s outcomes. The Board of Directors of each ﬁrm chooses
an incentive contract for the manager which maximizes the ﬁrm’s market value. With a ﬁnite
number of ﬁrms, the equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal only when investors are risk neutral
and ﬁrms’ outcomes are independent. The ineﬃciencies which arise when investors are risk averse,
or when ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by a common shock, are studied and it is shown that under reasonable
assumptions there is under investment in eﬀort in equilibrium. The ineﬃciencies exist when the
ﬁrms are not completely negligible, as is typical of the large corporations with dispersed ownership
traded on public exchanges in the US. In the idealized case where ﬁrms of each type are replicated
and replaced by a continuum of ﬁrms of each type with independent outcomes, the ineﬃciencies
disappear.1. Introduction
Economies with incomplete markets have been the focus of much study in general equilibrium the-
ory during the last twenty-ﬁve years. Since asymmetry of information is one of the main sources
of incompleteness of markets, there has recently been considerable interest in incorporating moral
hazard and adverse selection into general equilibrium models, in particular into models with ﬁ-
nancial markets.1 The focus of this paper is on the problem of moral hazard. In most general
equilibrium models with moral hazard, beginning with Prescott-Townsend (1984 a,b) it is assumed
that there is a continuum of agents of each type who are subject to independent shocks. Since in
the real world, on any ﬁnite number of time periods, there is only a ﬁnite number of agents, a model
with a continuum of agents must be interpreted as an approximation for a large but ﬁnite econ-
omy. The formal framework for showing that a continuum economy is the limit of ﬁnite economies
has been presented by Hildenbrand (1974), and similar arguments justify studying economies with
asymmetric information and a continuum of agents as the limit of ﬁnite economies.
In traditional general equilibrium theory, economies with a continuum of agents and ﬁnite
economies have the same properties, except that the assumptions of convexity needed to obtain
continuity of supplies and demands in ﬁnite economies—and hence existence of an equilibrium—are
not needed with a continuum of agents: the convexifying eﬀect of large numbers, expressed by the
Lyapounov theorem, replaces the continuity of individual reaction functions. Otherwise continuum
economies have the same normative properties as the ﬁnite economies which they approximate: as
long agents (consumers and ﬁrms) are assumed to be price takers2 a competitive equilibrium is
Pareto optimal.
One role of the continuum in moral hazard economies is to solve the non-convexity problem
created by the presence of incentive constraints in agents’ budget sets so as to obtain existence of
equilibrium. It might be thought that, as in traditional equilibrium theory, the assumption of the
continuum plays no role in establishing the eﬃciency properties of an equilibrium. However this
paper presents a class of general equilibrium models with moral hazard for which ﬁnite economies
and continuum limit economies do not have the same normative properties: we study a model
with a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, each oﬀering an incentive contract to its manager, and show that
except under restrictive assumptions, the equilibrium is not constrained eﬃcient. However when
the ﬁrms are replicated and in the limit there is a continuum of ﬁrms of each type, the ineﬃciencies
1Kocherlakota (1998), Bisin-Gottardi (1999), Lisboa (2001), Magill-Quinzii (2002), Dubey-Geanakoplos (2002),
Dubey-Geanakoplos-Shubik (2005), Acharya-Bisin (2005).
2The price taking assumption is precisely justiﬁed only in the continuum where agents are negligible: however the
competitive analysis is useful only if the price taking behavior is a good approximation for large ﬁnite economies.
1disappear. Thus the result of constrained eﬃciency typically obtained in equilibrium models with
moral hazard (Prescott-Townsend (1984 a,b) and most of the papers in footnote 1) may depend
crucially on the assumption that there is a continuum of agents of each type.
The ﬁrms that we have in mind are corporations: the characteristic feature of the corporate form
of organization is that ownership is divided among a large number of shareholders, and control is
vested in professional managers. The separation of ownership and control implied by the corporate
form leads to the agency problem induced by the potential divergence of interests between managers
and shareholders.3 The principal-agent model is a useful way of formalizing the conﬂict of interest
between managers and shareholders, and leads to the idea that CEOs of large corporations should
be oﬀered incentive contracts to align their interests with those of the shareholders. However, given
that the CEO of a corporation is the “agent” of many principals, aligning the interests of CEOs
with those of shareholders may create general equilibrium eﬀects which are not apparent in the
standard bilateral principal-agent model.
To study this problem we consider a two-period economy with two groups of agents, I investors
(or shareholders) and K managers of K ﬁrms, in which managerial eﬀort is not observable and
inﬂuences the probabilities of the ﬁrms’ outcomes. The assignment of managers to ﬁrms is taken
as given. At date 0 there is trade on the ﬁnancial markets and the the Board of Directors of each
ﬁrm oﬀers an incentive contract to the ﬁrm’s manager. We make two simplifying assumptions: ﬁrst
the ﬁnancial markets are complete relative to the possible outcomes of ﬁrms, and second, managers
cannot undo the incentive contracts they are oﬀered by trading on the ﬁnancial markets. Moreover,
to capture the constantly changing and widely dispersed ownership by the shareholders, we assume
that the Board of Directors does not know the speciﬁc preferences of the shareholders, only that
they are risk-averse and prefer more income to less from their ownership of the ﬁrm. As a result
we assume that the Board of Directors chooses a contract for the ﬁrm’s manager which maximizes
the market value of the ﬁrm, which, as we shall see, is well deﬁned in our setting.
This leads to a concept of equilibrium in which investors trade on the ﬁnancial markets, choos-
ing their holdings of equity shares in the ﬁrms, and managers are oﬀered incentive contracts which
maximize the market values of their ﬁrms. We study the normative properties of the equilib-
ria of this model, and ﬁnd that the conditions under which market-value maximization leads to
constrained Pareto optimality are restrictive: investors must be risk neutral and ﬁrms’ outcomes
must be independent. Thus under the assumptions which best reﬂect the stylized facts about
3That the agency problem is inherent in the corporate form was the central thesis of the classic work of Berle and
Means (1932).
2equity markets—risk-averse investors and correlated outcomes of ﬁrms—the equilibrium levels of
managerial eﬀort are not socially optimal.
To clarify the sources of ineﬃciency we decompose the study of the model into two cases. In
the ﬁrst, investors are risk averse but ﬁrms’ outcomes are independent; in the second, investors
are risk neutral and ﬁrms’ outcomes are aﬀected by a common unobservable shock. The ﬁrst
source of ineﬃciency, linked to the risk aversion of the shareholders, comes from the fact that
in the principal-agent model managerial eﬀort aﬀects the probabilities of ﬁrms’ outcomes. When
investorstrade on the ﬁnancial marketsthey evaluate the probabilitiesof outcomes—correctly under
the assumption of rational expectations—and this evaluation inﬂuences security prices. But eﬀort
shifts probabilities across outcomes, and security prices do not accurately signal the value of such a
shifting of probabilities: rather they provide a well-deﬁned value for income in each outcome state,
expressed by the stochastic discount factor which is used by the ﬁrms to maximize the present value
of proﬁt. We show that under these circumstances maximizing a weighted sum of expected utilities
of the investors (what a planner does) and maximizing the present value of the ﬁrms’ proﬁts (what
the equilibrium does) in general give diﬀerent results, leading to under-provision of eﬀort at the
equilibrium.
The second source of ineﬃciency comes from the way an optimal contract makes use of available
information. Although ﬁrms’ outcomes are conditionally independent so that there is no direct
externality, the optimal contract for a manager uses the information contained in the outcomes of
other ﬁrms to infer how much of the manager’s outcome can be attributed to the common shock
and how much is attributable to the manager’s eﬀort, and it is this use of information in an optimal
contract which induces an externality between the actions of the ﬁrms’ managers.
In the last section of the paper we show that both sources of ineﬃciency disappear when ﬁrms are
replicated and in the limit replaced by a continuum of identical ﬁrms of each type with independent,
or conditionally independent, outcomes. Thus the ineﬃciency arises from the fact that ﬁrms are
not completely negligible in the ﬁnite model.4 The corporations whose shares are traded on public
exchanges in the US are relatively small in number but contribute a signiﬁcant share of aggregate
output: our analysis highlights the potential ineﬃciencies created by such corporations. It would
certainly be of interest to assess the magnitude of the ineﬃciency and how rapidly it increases as
the economy departs from the continuum limit where all ﬁrms are negligible, but this is outside
the scope of this paper.
4In Section 2 we argue that even if ﬁrms are not negligble the competitive assumptions embedded in the equilibrium
concept are reasonable approximations provided the ownership of ﬁrms is suﬃciently diﬀused and the compensation
of a manager is only a small fraction of each ﬁrm’s gross proﬁt.
32. Stock Market Equilibrium and Constrained Pareto Optimality
The Model. Consider a one-good, two-period economy in which there are two groups of agents,
I investors and K managers, and a collection of K ﬁrms, each run by one of the managers. The
match between managers and ﬁrms is taken as given and, as in the standard principal agent model,
we assume that manager k has an exogenously given outside option yielding a utility level νk.F o r
each ﬁrm there is a ﬁnite number of possible outcomes and the probability of these outcomes is
inﬂuenced by the entrepreneurial eﬀort of its manager. Let (yk
sk)sk∈Sk denote the ﬁnite number






. An outcome for the economy at date 1 is a K-uple s =( s1,...,s K)
describing the realized output (or proﬁt) of each ﬁrm: we let S = S1×...×SK denote the outcome
space, ys =( y1
s1,...,yK
sK), s ∈ S, denoting the vector of outputs of the K ﬁrms in outcome s.
The eﬀort ek of manager k inﬂuences the probabilities of the outcomes of ﬁrm k: ek ∈ |R+ is
assumed to be unobservable. To permit common as well as idiosyncratic shocks to inﬂuence the
outcomes of the ﬁrms let p(s,e)=p(s1,...,s K,e 1,...,e K) denote the joint probability of the
outcomes, given the eﬀort levels e =( e1,...,e K) chosen by the managers. The function p is
assumed to be common knowledge for the agents in the economy. When we need to focus on a
typical ﬁrm k, it will be convenient to use the notation s =( sk,s −k) and e =( ek,e −k), where
s−k =( s1,...,s k−1,s k+1,...,s K) and e−k is deﬁned in the same way.
All agents in the economy, investors and managers, are assumed to have expected-utility pref-
erences over date 1 consumption streams—at date 0 agents trade on ﬁnancial markets and write
contracts, but there is no date 0 consumption. Let ui : Xi → |R denote the concave, increasing,
VNM utility function of investor i, i ∈ I. When investors are risk averse Xi = |R+, and when in-
vestors are risk neutral Xi = |R, since non-negativity constraints with linear utilities re-create risk
aversion through the multiplier at zero consumption. Let vk : |R+ → |R be the concave, increasing
VNM utility function of manager k, k ∈ K. The disutility of eﬀort is assumed to enter additively6
and is expressed by a convex, increasing cost function ck : |R+ → |R.
Stock Market Equilibrium with Fixed Contracts. Investors trade on security markets, where
the securities consist of contracts whose payoﬀs depend on the observable proﬁts of the ﬁrms,
securities such as equity, bonds, options on equity, or options on indices of equity contracts. Let J
5To economize on notation we use the same notation for the number of elements in a set and for the set itself.
6This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis of the optimal contract in the principal-agent model but is not innocuous:
see Bennardo-Chiappori (2003) and Panaccione (2005).
4denote the set of securities, and let V j
s ,s∈ S, j ∈ J, denote the payoﬀ of security j in outcome s.
If τk
s denotes the compensation paid to the manager of ﬁrm k in outcome s, then the vector of net
proﬁts for the K ﬁrms is




s ),s ∈ S
The payoﬀ of each security j is some function φj : |RK → |R of the observable vector of net
proﬁts of the K ﬁrms, V j




s ,1≤ k ≤ K. The ﬁrms’ outcomes, indexed by s ∈ S, thus constitute the state space
for the investors, and we assume that the security structure is suﬃciently rich for the ﬁnancial
markets to be complete with respect to the outcome space S: thus if V =[ V j
s ,s∈ S,j ∈ J ] denotes
the matrix of date 1 payoﬀs of the securities
rank(V)=S
Note that by making the payment to manager k depend on the entire vector of proﬁts of all ﬁrms,
summarized in s, we are assuming that the class of contracts in which the Board of Directors (BOD)
of ﬁrm k chooses the contract of the manager includes all possible forms of relative performance
compensation.
Firms are owned by the investors: δi
k ≥ 0 denotes agent i’s initial ownership share of ﬁrm k,
and the shares are normalized so that
P
i∈I δi
k =1 ,k∈ K. The investors have no initial holdings
of the remaining securities which are in zero net supply: let δi =( δi
1,...,δi
K,0,...,0) denote
investor i’s vector of initial holdings of the securities. To facilitate the description of equilibrium,
we ﬁrst deﬁne an equilibrium assuming that the compensation of the managers and their eﬀort
levels (τ,e)=( τk,e k,k ∈ K) have been chosen. We then deﬁne the equilibrium concept that is
studied in this paper, in which the portfolios of the investors and the contracts of the managers are
chosen simultaneously (Deﬁnition 2).
Let ps,s∈ S, be the probabilities of the outcomes anticipated by the investors when they trade
securities, let q =( qj)j∈J denote the vector of security prices, and let (xi,zi)=( xi
s,s∈ S,zi
j,j∈ J)
denote the vector of consumption and the (new) portfolio of securities chosen by investor i. The
date 0 and date 1 budget equations
q(zi − δi) ≤ 0,x i = Vz i,z i ∈ |RJ (1)
deﬁne the consumption streams that an investor can attain by trading on the ﬁnancial markets:
the portfolio zi must ﬁnance the consumption stream xi of the investor.
5Deﬁnition 1. A stock market equilibrium with ﬁxed contracts(τ,e)is a pair((¯ x, ¯ z), ¯ q)=( (¯ xi, ¯ zi,i∈ I),
(¯ qj,j∈ J)), consisting of actions by investors and security prices such that








￿ ¯ q(zi − δi) ≤ 0,x i = Vz i,z i ∈ |RJ
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j =0 , j ∈ J, j>K .
(iii) V = φ(y − τ), ps = p(s,e),s∈ S.
Remark 1: A stock marketequilibriumwith ﬁxed contractsassumes competitive ﬁnancialmarkets—
in (i) investors are price takers—and correct anticipations: in (iii) investors take as given the con-
tracts τ proposed by the ﬁrms and correctly infer the vector of eﬀort e that they induce from the
managers. For the competitive assumption to be a good approximation, each investor should be
“small”: the initial ownership of the ﬁrms must be dispersed among many small shareholders, i.e.
I must be suﬃciently large and δi
k suﬃciently small.
If ¯ λi =( ¯ λi
0,¯ λi
1,...,¯ λi
S) denotes the vector of multipliers for the S +1 constraints of investor i’s











s ,j∈ J, i ∈ I (2)
If we let ˆ πi =( ¯ λi
s/¯ λi
0,s∈ S) denote the vector of present values of income of investor i, then
the second equation in (2) can be written as ˆ πiV =¯ q. Since the ﬁnancial markets are complete
with respect to the outcome states (rank(V)=S), given ¯ q and V there is a unique vector ˆ π ￿ 0
satisfying the equation ˆ πV =¯ q, so that ˆ πi =ˆ π,i∈ I. The common vector









,i ∈ I (3)
which factors out the probabilities of the outcome states from the vector of present values ˆ π, i.e.
ˆ πs =¯ πsps,s ∈ S (4)
is called the (common) stochastic discount factor of the investors at the stock market equilibrium.
This decomposition of each present-value price into a product of a probability and a stochastic
discount factor will play an important role in the analysis that follows.
6The present-value vector ˆ π implied by the valuation ¯ q of the securities—which asserts that the
price of security j is the present value of its future dividend stream—can be used to evaluate the
present value of any income stream. In particular investor i’s budget equations (1) can be written
in present-value form, since ˆ πV =¯ q implies




kˆ π(yk − τk)
so that the present value of investor i’s consumption must not exceed the present value of his
initial holdings of ﬁrms. When this constraint is satisﬁed any income stream xi can be created
by appropriately trading on the security markets since rank (V)=S. The budget set, written in
sequential form in (i) of Deﬁnition 1, can be written in the equivalent present-value form










Thus an equivalent and more condensed way of representing a stock market equilibrium when
ﬁnancial markets are complete is obtained by assuming that investors directly purchase income
streams, the unit price of income in outcome s being ˆ πs. Since the matrix V is invertible and the
equation ˆ πV =¯ q is satisﬁed at a stock market equilibrium, any asset price ¯ q deﬁnes a vector of
present-value prices ˆ π and conversely. The market-clearing equations (ii) on the security markets






(yk − τk) (6)
on the markets for the good (income). It will sometimes be convenient to refer to the pair (¯ x, ˆ π),
where each investor chooses ¯ xi to maximize expected utility over the budget set (5) and markets
clear as expressed in (6), as a reduced-form stock market equilibrium.
Stock Market Equilibrium. In the above concept of equilibrium, whether expressed in terms
of the asset prices ¯ q or of the present-value prices ˆ π, we assumed that the contracts (τ,e) oﬀered
to the managers were ﬁxed: we now explain how these contracts come to be determined. The
assumption that the stock market is competitive requires that ownership be diﬀused among a large
number of shareholders, each with small ownership shares. This, combined with the fact that
shares are exchanged at date 0 among investors, suggests that it would be too costly for the Board
of Directors to elicit precise information on the preferences of the shareholders. What shareholders
receive from the ﬁrm is a share of the net proﬁt (yk
s −τk
s ,s∈ S): it seems natural, in the absence of
7speciﬁc information on the preferences of the shareholders, that the BOD would seek to maximize
the present value of this proﬁt ˆ πs(yk
s − τk
s ) or, what is equivalent, the market value ¯ qk of the ﬁrm.
As indicated in (4) the present-value prices can be decomposed into a product ˆ πs =¯ πsp(s,e)
of the stochastic discount factor of the investors and the probability of outcome s. The second
competitive assumption that we make is that the BOD takes the stochastic discount factor ¯ π =
(¯ πs,s∈ S) as given. Note that this is indirectly an assumption on the reservation utility levels
(νk)k∈K of the ﬁrms’ managers. For ﬁrm k can inﬂuence the consumption (xi
s,i∈ I) of the investors




s ). Since the total output of
ﬁrm k in outcome s is ﬁxed at yk
sk, it can only aﬀect net aggregate output through the choice of τk
s .
If the level of compensation τk of the manager, which is determined by the manager’s reservation
utility νk, is only a small fraction of yk, the possibility of inﬂuencing net aggregate output in
outcome s will be negligible, even if the ﬁrm’s output yk is not a completely negligible fraction of
total output.
The BOD of each ﬁrm now faces a principal-agent problem in a market setting. The BOD
of ﬁrm k (the principal) chooses the incentive contract τk to oﬀer its manager (the agent) which
will induce the eﬀort ek which maximizes the market value of the ﬁrm (net of the payment to the
manager). Since eﬀort ek is unobservable, the BOD must respect the incentive constraint that ek
is the optimal response of manager k to the contract τk. It must also ensure that the resulting
expected utility of the manager net of the cost of eﬀort meets the reservation utility level νk of the
outside option.
The compensation package τk oﬀered by the BOD to the manager works by exposing the man-
ager to risk: if, after receiving the contract, manager k could turn to the ﬁnancial markets to hedge
against these risks then the incentives that τk was designed to provide may be eliminated. Some as-
sumption regarding the trading opportunities available to the manager must therefore been made.7
The assumption that we make, which is the simplest and most direct for the purpose of this paper
is that the manager is not permitted to trade on ﬁnancial markets: the manager’s consumption
stream thus coincides with his compensation and the full force of the incentives embodied in τk is
retained.
7An alternative approach, introduced in our earlier paper Magill-Quinzii (2002) and further explored by Acharya-
Bisin (2005), is to assume that a manager is given full access to ﬁnancial markets, but that the trades are observable
by the investors. In this setting investors deduce the optimal eﬀort of a manager from his portfolio and the manager
knows that his portfolio will inﬂuence the market value of the ﬁrm. Provided the manager has a suﬃciently large
initial stake in the ﬁrm (strictly speaking is full initial owner) the market, through the observability of trades, can
act as an eﬀective disciplining device i.e. leads to the same outcome as an optimal contract. Thus the fact that a
manager can trade on the ﬁnancial markets need not eliminate managerial incentives provided that these trades are
observable.
8In practice ﬁrms’ managers do trade on ﬁnancial markets but there are restrictions on how
a manager can trade, in particular with respect of the securities related to his ﬁrm.8 A more
realistic approach to the design of an optimal contract by a principal (here the BOD) in the spirit
of Bisin-Gottardi-Rampini (2006) would take in to account the cost of monitoring the trades of
the manager, but this would lead to a more complex model in which it would be harder to exhibit
clearly the ineﬃciencies that are the focus of this paper.
Assuming that the ﬁnancial markets are complete with respect to the outcomes, and using the
present-value representation of a stock market equilibrium, leads to the following concept.
Deﬁnition 2. A stock market equilibrium is a pair of actions and prices (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e,(ˆ π, ¯ π)) = ((¯ xi)i∈I,
(¯ τk,¯ ek)k∈K,( ˆ π,¯ π)) consisting of consumption streams for investors, contracts and eﬀort levels for
managers, present-value prices and stochastic discount factors, such that
(i) for i ∈ I, investor i chooses the optimal consumption stream


































(ii) ps = p(s,¯ e),s ∈ S
(iii) ˆ πs =¯ πsps,s ∈ S
(iv) for k ∈ K, the BOD of ﬁrm k chooses (¯ τk,¯ ek), the contract of the manager and the eﬀort





s )¯ πsp(s,ek,¯ e−k)
on the set of (τk,e k) ∈ |RS




s )p(s,ek,¯ e−k)− ck(ek) ≥ νk (PCk)
8Some authors have recently noted that new securities have been introduced which reduce the eﬀectiveness of























The same deﬁnition without the incentive constraints (ICk) deﬁnes a stock market equilibrium with
observable eﬀort. If all the agents’ consumption streams are in the interior of their consumption
sets and all managers exert positive eﬀort levels in the equilibrium, we will say that the equilibrium
is interior.
Remark 2: The concept of equilibrium in Deﬁnition 2 describes the interaction between ﬁnancial
markets and contracts in a setting where there is risk sharing among investors and moral hazard
in the creation of incentives for managers of ﬁrms. (i), (ii) and (v) deﬁne a reduced-form stock
market equilibrium for investors, in which they take the contracts and associated managerial eﬀort
levels (¯ τ,¯ e) as given. As in models with rational expectations the investors are assumed to be well
informed: they are aware of the contracts ¯ τ oﬀered by the BOD of each ﬁrm to its manager, and
they know the risk aversion, cost of eﬀort, and ability of each manager with suﬃcient precision to
deduce the optimal eﬀort levels (¯ ek)k∈K and the associated probabilities p(s,¯ e) for the collective
outcomes of the ﬁrms.9
The security markets in turn give the BOD of each ﬁrm information on the risk aversion of
investors through the decomposition (iii) of the present-value prices (ˆ πs) into the product of the
probabilities p(s,¯ e) and the common stochastic discount factor ¯ πs of the investors (equal by (3) to
each agent’s marginal value of income in outcome s). The stochastic discount factor ¯ π determines
the risk premium on any security, and in particular on the equity of ﬁrm k. The objective for ﬁrm
k in (iv) can be written10 as
Eek(yk − τk)+co v ek(¯ π,yk − τk)
where Eek and covek indicate that the probabilities p(s,ek,¯ e−k), used in calculating the expectation
and covariance, take into account the eﬀect of manager’s k eﬀort but take as given the eﬀort levels
of the managers of ﬁrms other than k. In determining the optimal eﬀort of the manager, the BOD
9A discussion of the institutional features of security markets which justify making these strong assumptions on
the information available to investors as a useful ﬁrst approximation, can be found in Section 2.3 of Magill-Quinzii
(2002).
10To write the objective function of the ﬁrm in this form the present-value prices need to be normalized so that P
s ˆ πs = 1. This is equivalent to normalizing prices so that the interest rate is zero: since there is no consumption
at date 0, there is no reason to have an interest rate diﬀerent from zero in this model.
10takes into account the covariance, or risk-premium, term in the valuation of ﬁrm k, under the
competitive assumption discussed above that the eﬀect of τk on ¯ π is ignored.
To study the normative properties of a stock market equilibrium we will compare it with the
allocation that would be chosen by a planner seeking to maximize social welfare subject to the
same incentive constraints as those faced by the ﬁrms’ BODs.

















s,s ∈ S (RCs)






s )p(s,˜ ek,e −k) − ck(˜ ek) | ˜ ek ∈ |R+
)
(ICk)
An allocation (x,τ,e)i sconstrained Pareto optimal (CPO) if it is constrained feasible and there
does not exist another constrained feasible allocation which is weakly preferred by all agents, and
strictly by at least one agent. The same deﬁnition without the incentive constraints (ICk) deﬁnes
a ﬁrst-best optimum.
First-order conditions for Equilibrium and CPO. A natural approach to comparing equilib-
rium allocations (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e) with constrained Pareto optimal allocations is to compare the ﬁrst-order
conditions (FOCs) for equilibrium and constrained optimality. To derive the FOCs, consider a
setting in which the incentive constraint (ICk) can be replaced by the ﬁrst-order condition for








k(ek) = 0 (IC0
k)
Let (¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π)11 be an interior equilibrium. To simplify notation12 set p(s,e)=ps. There exists a
vector of multipliers (¯ λ, ¯ β, ¯ µ)=( ( ¯ λi)i∈I,(¯ βk, ¯ µk)k∈K) ≥ 0 such that
11From now on we simplify the notation for a stock market equilibrium by omitting the present-value prices ˆ π
which do not play a direct role in the analysis of the rest of the paper.
12Depending on the circumstances we will use the notation p(s,e)o rp(sk,s
−k,e k,e
−k), or, when the expressions
become complex, the shorter notation ps(e) or just ps.
11(i) u0
i(¯ xi
s)=¯ λi¯ πs,s ∈ S, i ∈ I
(ii)









































where ¯ λi is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint in investor i’s utility maximization
problem, and (¯ βk, ¯ µk) are the multipliers associated with the participation constraint (PCk) and
the transformed incentive constraint (IC0
k) for manager k. If eﬀort is observable, the incentive
constraints do not exist (are not binding) and the FOCs are the same with ¯ µ = 0. If eﬀort is
unobservable and (IC0
k) is binding, the second term in (iii) is equal to zero.
If (x,τ,e) is an interior constrained Pareto optimal allocation then for some positive weights
(α,β) ∈ |RI+K















s )p(s,ek,e −k) − ck(ek)
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k(ek)=0 ,k ∈ K (IC0
k)
where the incentive constraints (ICk) have been replaced by the ﬁrst-order conditions (IC0
k). Thus
there will exist non-negative multipliers ((πs)s∈S,(µk)k∈K) such that
(i)∗ αiu0
i(xi


























































where αi (resp βk) is the weight of investor i (manager k) in the social welfare function, πs (or
more accurately πsps) is the multiplier associated with the resource constraint for outcome s, and
12µk is the multiplier associated with the incentive constraint for manager k. As before, if eﬀort is
observable µ = 0, while if eﬀort is not observable the third term in (iii)∗ is equal to zero.
The FOCs (i), (ii) and (i)∗, (ii)∗ which describe how risk is distributed between investors and
managers so as to induce the appropriate eﬀort on the part of the managers are the same, implying
that the contracts which are optimal from the point of view of the shareholders to induce given
eﬀort levels of the managers are also the socially eﬃcient way of inducing this eﬀort. The FOCs
(iii) and (iii)∗ however are diﬀerent: while they evaluate the marginal cost of an additional unit
of eﬀort by manager k in the same way, they diﬀer in the way they evaluate its marginal beneﬁt.
For the planner, the social beneﬁt is measured by its eﬀect on the expected utility of all other
agents in the economy, namely all investors i ∈ I and all managers j ∈ K,j 6= k, with incentive-
corrected weights, while in equilibrium the marginal beneﬁt of manager k’s eﬀort is measured by
its eﬀect on the proﬁt of ﬁrm k. We will show however that these two distinct ways of measuring
marginal beneﬁt in fact coincide when investors are risk neutral (ui(xi)=xi) and ﬁrms’ outcomes
are independent. Proving this property will then suggest that in all other cases the FOCs for
optimal eﬀort (iii) in equilibrium and (iii)∗ in a social optimum are diﬀerent.
When Equilibrium is CPO. We say that the random outcomes of the ﬁrms are independent if
for each k ∈ K there exists a probability function pk(·,e k)o nSk, which depends on the eﬀort of





Since the FOCs are necessary but, because of possible non-convexities, are not in general suﬃ-
cient for constrained eﬃciency, we will show that under risk-neutrality and independence a stock
market equilibrium is CPO without using the ﬁrst-order conditions.
Proposition 1. If all investors are risk neutral and ﬁrms’ outcomes are independent, if the VNM
utility indices of the managers are strictly concave and satisfy vk(c) →− ∞as c → 0, then a stock
market equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal.
Proof. Let (¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π) ∈ |RIS × |RKS
+ × |RK
+ × |RS
++ be a stock market equilibrium. We ﬁrst show
that ¯ τk(sk,s −k) depends only on sk and is independent of the realizations s−k of the other ﬁrms.
Suppose not, i.e. suppose that for two outcomes s =( sk,s −k) and s0 =( s0
k,s 0−k), with sk = s0
k,
we have ¯ τk(s) 6=¯ τk(s0). For a random variable ξ : S → |R, let Ee(ξ)=
P
s∈S p(s,e)ξ(s) denote its







p(s−k,¯ e−k)vk(¯ τk(sk,s −k)) (7)
Deﬁne ˜ τk(sk)=
P
s−k∈S−k p(s−k,¯ e−k)¯ τk(sk,s −k). Since ¯ τk(s) 6=¯ τk(s0), by strict concavity of vk
there exists b(·) ≥ 0 such that
vk(˜ τk(sk) − b(sk)) =
X
s−k∈S−k
p(s−k,¯ e−k)vk(¯ τk(sk,s −k)) (8)
with b(sk) > 0 for at least one sk. If manager k is oﬀered the contract ˜ τk(sk) − b(sk) for sk ∈ Sk,
independently of s−k, by (8) the participation constraint is still satisﬁed and, since the coeﬃcient
of pk(sk,¯ ek) in (7) has not changed, ¯ ek is still the optimal eﬀort. However, since E¯ eb(s) > 0, the
expected cost of the contract is lower, contradicting proﬁt maximization. Thus ¯ τk(sk,s −k) depends
only on sk.












s,s ∈ S (9)
ˆ ek is optimal for manager k given ˆ τk and
Eˆ e(ˆ xi) ≥ E¯ e(¯ xi),i ∈ I, Eˆ e(vk(ˆ τk))− ck(ˆ ek) ≥ E¯ e(vk(¯ τk)) − ck(¯ ek),k∈ K (10)
with strict inequality for some i or some k. By the same reasoning as above we know that there
exists a contract ˜ τk, which depends only on sk such that ˆ ek is optimal for this contract and
Eˆ ev(˜ τk)=Eˆ ev(ˆ τk), ˜ τk ≤
X
s−k∈S−k
p(s−k,ˆ e−k)(ˆ τk(sk,s −k))
Since (˜ τk,ˆ ek) satisfy the (PCk) and (ICk) constraints, and since ˜ τk only depends on sk, it could
have been chosen in the maximization of expected proﬁt. It follows that
E¯ e(yk − ¯ τk)=
X
sk∈Sk
pk(sk,¯ ek)(yk − ¯ τk(sk) ≥
X
sk∈Sk
pk(sk,ˆ ek)(yk − ˜ τk(sk) ≥ Eˆ e(yk − ˆ τk) (11)
Suppose that in (10), it is investor i who is strictly better oﬀ, Eˆ e(ˆ xi) >E ¯ e(¯ xi). Then
P
i∈I Eˆ e(ˆ xi) >
P
i∈I E¯ e(¯ xi)=
P
k∈K Eˆ e(yk − ¯ τk) ≥
P
k∈K Eˆ e(yk − ˆ τk), which contradicts the feasibility condition
(9). Suppose that in (10), it is manager k who is strictly better oﬀ with (ˆ τk,ˆ ek). Then the ﬁrst
inequality in (11) must be strict, once again contradicting the feasibility condition (9). For suppose
14that the ﬁrst inequality in (11) holds with equality. Since manager k is strictly better oﬀ with
(˜ τk,ˆ ek), the (PCk) constraint is not binding and −∞ <v k(˜ τk) implies ˜ τk ￿ 0. Thus for ε>0
suﬃciently small and for each outcome sk ∈ Sk the manager’s reward can be decreased by ∆τk(sk)
in such a way that
vk(˜ τk(sk)− ∆τk(sk)) = vk(˜ τk(sk)) − ε, sk ∈ Sk
The (PCk) constraint is still satisﬁed, and since Ee(vk(˜ τk − ∆τk)) = Ee(vk(˜ τk)) − ε for all e, the
optimal eﬀort is still ˆ ek. But the expected cost can be decreased by Eˆ e(∆τk), which contradicts
proﬁt maximization. 2
Remark 3. Since an equilibrium with risk-neutral investors and independent ﬁrms is constrained
Pareto optimal, the ﬁrst-order conditions (i)-(iii) for an equilibrium must coincide with the ﬁrst-
order conditions (i)∗-(iii)∗ for CPO, and it is instructive to understand why this is so. (i), (ii)
and (i)∗, (ii)∗ clearly coincide, so consider (iii) and (iii)∗. Let p0
k(sk,·) denote the derivative of the








so that by (ii) the contract of manager k only depends on sk and not on the realizations of other
ﬁrms: this property was also derived directly in the proof of Proposition 1 without using the FOCs.








































which is equal to zero since
P
sk∈Sk p0
k(sk,e k) = 0. Furthermore the third term in (iii)∗ is zero
since the incentive constraint is binding. Since with linear preferences for the investors an interior















s ) − c00(ek)
!
=0 ,k ∈ K






















































k(sk,e k)=0a n d
P
s−k∈S−k p(s−k,e −k) = 1, and, since risk neutrality implies πs =
1,s∈ S, (12) coincides with the ﬁrst term of (iii), so that (iii)∗ coincides with (iii).
Since risk neutrality and independence play an essential role in showing the equivalence of (iii)
and (iii)∗, it seems likely that this equivalence will fail if either risk aversion or independence is not
satisﬁed: let us show that this is indeed the case and examine the consequences.
3. Local Analysis
Whenever a competitive equilibrium is not constrained Pareto optimal, it is a sign that some
form of externality—whether pecuniary or direct—is present which has not been internalized at
equilibrium. In the analysis that followswe examine the nature of the externalities whose eﬀects are
not fully internalized when the assumptions of Proposition 1 are not satisﬁed. Whenever possible,
we sign the bias in the provision of managerial eﬀort at equilibrium.
The procedure that we adopt to determine whether there is under or over provision of eﬀort
at equilibrium is based on a comparison of the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC)E and (FOC)CP at an
equilibrium and a constrained Pareto optimum respectively. More precisely the general procedure
is as follows. Suppose (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e,¯ π) is an interior stock market equilibrium. Under assumptions which
will be spelled out below, the ﬁrst-order approach (replacing the incentive constraints by the ﬁrst-
order condition (IC0
k)) is valid and there exist multipliers (¯ λ, ¯ β,¯ µ)=( ( ¯ λ)i∈I,(¯ βk, ¯ µk)k∈K) ≥ 0 such
that (i)-(iii) in (FOC)E are satisﬁed. To evaluate the optimality of the equilibrium, consider the
social welfare function W¯ α,¯ β(x,τ,e) deﬁned in the previous section where the investors’ weights
¯ αi =1 /¯ λi,i∈ I, are the inverse of the marginal utilities of income and the managers’ weights
¯ βk,k∈ K, are the multipliers of the participation constraints (PCk). Let RCs(x,τ) and IC0
k(τ,e),
denote the functions which permit the resource and incentive constraints (RCs) and (IC0
k) in the
previous section to be written as RCs(x,τ)=0 ,s∈ S and IC0
k(τ,e)=0 ,k∈ K. Consider the
Lagrangian function ¯ L(x,τ,e) deﬁned by
¯ L(x,τ,e)=W¯ α,¯ β(x,τ,e)− ˆ πRC(x,τ)+¯ µIC0(τ,e)
16where the multipliers (ˆ π, ¯ µ), with ˆ πs =¯ πsps(¯ e), are evaluated at the equilibrium. With this choice
of weights (¯ α, ¯ β) and multipliers (ˆ π, ¯ µ), it is clear that the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC)E (i)-(ii)
and (FOC)CP (i∗)-(ii∗) coincide so that
Dx ¯ L(¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e)=0 ,D τ ¯ L(¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e)=0
If we can sign the gradient of ¯ L with respect to e, then we can deduce, at least locally, if there is
under or over-provision of managerial eﬀort at equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e,¯ π) is an interior stock market equilibrium and if De ¯ L(¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e) ￿ 0, then
there exists a constrained feasible marginal reallocation
(¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e) −→ (¯ x +∆ x, ¯ τ +∆ τ,¯ e+∆ e)
with ∆e>0 which is Pareto improving.
Proof: It is convenient to introduce the following more condensed vector notation: let p(e)=
(ps(e))s∈S,u i(xi)=( ui(xi
s))s∈S,v k(τk)=( vk(τk
s ))s∈S and for a pair of vectors x,y ∈ |RS, let
x ◦ y =( xsys)s∈S denote the vector in |RS obtained by component-wise multiplication. Consider
any semi-positive13 marginal change in the vector of eﬀort levels of the managers ¯ e → ¯ e +∆e with
∆e =( ∆ e1,...,∆eK) > 0. Choose a change ∆τk in the reward of each manager k ∈ K such that
the utility level of the manager is unchanged and the incentive constraint (IC0
k) stays satisﬁed to
terms of ﬁrst order. Thus for each k we must ﬁnd ∆τk ∈ |RS such that
p(¯ e) ◦ v0
k(¯ τk)∆τk + Dep(¯ e)∆e · vk(¯ τk) − c0(¯ ek)∆ek =0
Dekp(¯ e) ◦ v0
k(¯ τk)∆τk + D2
e,ekp(¯ e)∆e ·vk(¯ τk) − c00(¯ ek)∆ek =0
The vector p(¯ e)◦v0





= 0, the vector Dekp(¯ e)◦v0
k(¯ τk) has positive
and negative elements. Thus the two vectors are linearly independent, so that a solution ∆τk ∈ |RS
to this pair of equations always exists for each k ∈ K.
For each investor i =2 ,...,I choose a change in consumption ¯ xi → ¯ xi +∆ xi such that the
utility of investor i is unchanged
p(¯ e) ◦ u0
i(¯ xi)∆xi + Dep(¯ e)∆e · ui(¯ xi)=0




k∈K ∆τk = 0. Let ¯ L = L(¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e;ˆ π, ¯ µ); the change in ¯ L induced by the change (∆x,∆τ,∆e)
13For z ∈ R
K,z is semi-positive (we write z>0) if z ≥ 0 and z 6= 0).
17in the allocation satisﬁes
∆ ¯ L = Dx ¯ L∆x + Dτ ¯ L∆τ + De ¯ L∆e>0
since Dx ¯ L = Dτ ¯ L = 0 and De ¯ L￿0. Since (∆x,∆τ,∆e) has been chosen so that ∆RC =0 ,
∆IC0 = 0, and the utility of all managers and investors except for investor 1 is unchanged, it
follows that ∆ ¯ L =∆ W¯ α,¯ β = α1∆(p(¯ e)u1(¯ x1)) > 0, so that the reallocation (¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e) → (¯ x+∆x,¯ τ +
∆τ,¯ e+∆ e) is Pareto improving. 2
We analyze the eﬀect of removing the assumptions of investor risk neutrality and of indepen-
dence of ﬁrms’ outcomes separately. We begin by studying the eﬀect of risk aversion of investors.
4. Eﬀect of Risk Aversion
The approach to modeling uncertainty for the principal-agent problem, originally proposed by
Mirrlees (1976)—by which the eﬀort of the agent inﬂuences the probability of the outcome—
inevitably brings with it a built-in external eﬀect, since the agent’s action aﬀects the expected
utility of the principal. In our setting the eﬀort ek of manager k aﬀects the expected utility
P
s∈S p(s,e)ui(xi
s) of each investor. It is akin to an externality of ﬁrm k on all the consumers in the
economy. Given the Mirrlees’ approach to modeling uncertainty, the externality is always present;
however given additional assumptions on the characteristics of the economy, it may or may not
create an ineﬃciency. In Section 1 we saw that if investors are risk neutral there is no (constrained)
ineﬃciency: this is because the expected utilities of the investors coincide with their expected
income, which is precisely what the BOD maximizes. In this case the criterion of present-value
maximization ensures that the externality is internalized.
When investors are risk averse, their expected utilities
P
s∈S p(s,e)ui(xi
s),i∈ I, no longer co-
incide with the market values of their consumption streams. In this case, as we show below, the
externality creates an ineﬃciency;14 furthermore we show that the sign of the bias in managerial
eﬀort at equilibrium can be determined. Under reasonable assumptions market-value maximiza-
tion systematically under-values risk, so that increasing managerial eﬀort would lead to a Pareto
improvement.
To establish this result we retain the assumption that ﬁrms’ outcomes are independent, so that
p(s,e)=
QK
k=1 pk(sk,e k). Since the analysis is based on an examination of ﬁrst-order conditions at
equilibrium, we introduce suﬃcient conditions which ensure that the incentive constraint of each
manager can be characterized by a single equation, and that the associated multipliercan be signed.
14In the bilateral principal-agent model, maximization of the principal’s expected utility subject to the participation
and incentive constraints of the agent internalizes the externality.
18A1. The utility functions (vk)k∈K of managers are diﬀerentiable, increasing, strictly concave on
|R+ and vk(c) →− ∞as c → 0, for all k ∈ K.
A2. The utility functions (ui)i∈I of investors are diﬀerentiable, increasing, strictly concave on
|R+ and u0
i(c) →∞as c → 0, for all i ∈ I.
A3. Firms’ outcomes are independent.




is an increasing function of sk.
A5. For all k ∈ K, and minsk(yk
sk) ≤ α<maxsk(yk
sk), 1 − Fk(α,ek) ≡
P
{sk|yk
sk>α} pk(sk,e k)i s
a concave, increasing function of ek.














is increasing in sk: higher eﬀort makes higher outcomes more likely. A5 implies that the probability
that yk
sk is greater than any ﬁxed value α increases with eﬀort, but at a decreasing rate: it is either
called Stochastic Decreasing Returns to Eﬀort or Convexity of the Distribution Function (since
under A5 F(α,ek) is convex in ek). Rogerson (1985) showed that under A1, A4, A5 the ﬁrst-order
approach, which consists in replacing the incentive constraint (ICk) by the ﬁrst-order condition
(IC0
k) is valid. Also, since the paper of Grossmann-Hart (1983), A4 and A5 have been used to
derive properties of the optimal incentive contract. The paper of Jewitt (1988) emphasized that
A5 is restrictive, but recently Li-Calzi and Spaeter (2003) exhibited large classes of distribution
functions F(α,ek) satisfying A4 and A5.
Proposition 3. Let A1-A5 be satisﬁed. If (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e,¯ π) is an interior stock market equilibrium
(with or without observable eﬀort) such that for all k ∈ K and all s−k ∈ S−k, yk
sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k) is
positive and increasing in sk, then De ¯ L(¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e) ￿ 0.
Proof. Let (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π) be a stock market equilibrium. Assumptions A1, A4, A5 imply that in the
case where eﬀort is not observable and the incentive constraints have to be taken into account,
the ﬁrst-order approach is valid (Rogerson (1985)) so that the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC)E and
(FOC)CP are satisﬁed at equilibrium and at a CPO respectively.
Since at the equilibrium (iii) of (FOC)E holds, De ¯ L￿0 is equivalent to Ak(¯ x,¯ τ,¯ e) > 0 for all
19k, where
Ak(¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e)=
∂ ¯ L
∂ek
− ¯ π ◦
∂p(¯ e)
∂ek













vk(¯ τk) − c00(¯ ek)
!
i.e. Ak is obtained by subtracting (iii) from (iii)∗, and the notation is that introduced in the proof
of Proposition 2. Evaluating
∂ ¯ L
∂ek
and canceling terms gives

























































so that it only varies with sj.


























with ¯ αj = ¯ βj +¯ µj
p0
j(sj,¯ ej)
pj(sj,¯ ej). Thus Vs−k is the maximized social welfare function for all agents except
manager k, with managers weighted by their “incentive weights” ¯ αj.15 In view of A1 this function is
diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly concave. If a vector (ξ∗
i,i∈ I,ξ∗





















s−k(ξ)=ρ (see e.g. Magill-Quinzii (1996, p. 192)).
For any s−k =( sj)j6=k ∈ S−k, let Ys−k =
P
j6=k yj
sj denote the production of all ﬁrms excluding
k. In outcome s =( sk,s −k), the investors and the managers other than k share the output
Ys−k + yk
sk − ¯ τk




















sk − ¯ τk
s )
￿
=¯ πs =¯ π(sk,s −k). Thus Ak(¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e) can be written as


















sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k)
￿
(yk




15If eﬀort is observable, µj = 0 for all j ∈ K, and the weights of the managers are just their weights in the social
welfare function associated with the equilibrium.
20Deﬁne φ(χ)=Vs−k(Ys−k + χ) − V 0
s−k(Ys−k + χ)χ. Then φ0(χ)=−V 00
s−k(Ys−k)+χ)χ>0,∀χ>0
since Vs−k is strictly concave, so that φ is an increasing function. The monotone likelihood ratio
condition A4 implies that if ¯ ek > ˜ ek, the distribution function F(σ, ¯ ek)=
P
sk≤σ pk(sk,¯ ek) ﬁrst-
order stochastically dominates F(σ, ˜ ek) (see Rogerson (1985)). It follows that if yk
sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k)








sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k))




sk − ¯ τk(sk,s −k)) > 0. Thus Ak(¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e) > 0 and
the proof is complete. 2
Remark 4. Proposition 3 requires that the payoﬀ to the shareholders be an increasing function of
the ﬁrm’s output (proﬁt). If the model is viewed as a discrete version of the model with continuous
outcomes then the condition requires that the slope dτk/dyk of the reward schedule τk(yk)o f
the manager of ﬁrm k be less than 1. This is a condition which is intuitively reasonable and
is certainly satisﬁed in practice for the observed compensation of CEOs. Murphy (1999) studies
the compensation of CEOs for a large sample of leading US corporations during the 1990’s and
in particular examines how CEO compensation increases (on average) when shareholder wealth
increase by 1000$: the maximum reported number is 35$ or a slope of 0.035. But of course we
cannot be sure that the observed compensation schemes are optimal or close to being optimal. For
the model studied in this paper it is easy to specify outputs (yk
sk), probability functions pk(sk,e k),
preferences (ui)a n d( vk,c k), and reservation utility (νk) for the managers, so that the resulting
equilibrium compensation (¯ τk) schedules satisfy this condition: but we have not found simple
clear-cut restrictions on the parameters of the model ensuring that it is always true in equilibrium.
Remark 5. The key to the proof of Proposition 3 is that the planner in determining the optimal
eﬀort ek of manager k takes into account the change in the expected social welfare16 V (Y + yk
sk −
¯ τk
sk)sk∈Sk arising from the shift in probability across the stream of net outputs (yk
sk − ¯ τk
sk)sk∈Sk,





Since V is a concave function, V (Y + χ) − V 0(Y + χ)χ is increasing for χ>0, and the function
V (Y + χ) varies more than its “marginal function” V 0(Y + χ)χ, in the sense that
V (Y + χ2) − V(Y + χ1) >V0(Y + χ2)χ2 − V 0(Y + χ1)χ1, whenever χ2 >χ 1 (15)




















Figure 1: Diﬀerence between planner and market evaluation (area ABCGD)
Thus the shift in the probabilities arising from an increment to the eﬀort ek of manager k creates
greater gains in the welfare function of the planner than in the equilibrium proﬁt function, so that
the eﬀort chosen by the planner is greater than that in the equilibrium. The diﬀerence between the
planner’s and the market’s evaluation in (15) is shown in Figure 1. V(Y + χ2)− V(Y + χ1) is the
area DCEFG, while V 0(¯ Y + χ2)χ2 − V 0(¯ Y + χ1)χ1 is the area CEFG minus the area ABCD, and
area CEFG−area ABCD<area CEFG<area DCEFG
The error in the market evaluation is ABCGD. As Figure 1b illustrates, the ﬂatter the marginal
function V 0(Y +χ), either because Y is large or because agents are less risk averse, the smaller the
diﬀerence between the planner’s and the market’s evaluation, and hence the smaller the underin-
vestment in eﬀort at equilibrium.
Remark 6. Proposition 3 holds as soon as eﬀort inﬂuences probability and does not depend on
the non-observability of eﬀort: it comes from the fact that market value is linear, while maximizing
weighted expected utilities requires that it be nonlinear. If the model is presented in the framework
of the general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI) in which primitive states of nature
are explicitly modelled, there must be more primitive states than outcomes so that, even with the
assumption of complete markets with respect to the ﬁrms’ outcomes, markets are incomplete with
respect to the primitive states of nature. The problem here is not however of the same nature as
22the problem of the objective of the ﬁrm with incomplete markets studied by Ekern and Wilson
(1974), Radner (1974), Dr` eze (1974) and Grossman and Hart (1979), where the problem is the
indeterminacy of the stochastic discount factor used in the present-value calculation.17
5. Eﬀect of Common Shock
In this section we analyze the setting where there is mutual dependence between the outcomes
of the ﬁrms induced by the presence of a common shock. To isolate the eﬀect of such a mutual
dependence on the eﬃciency of the equilibrium we revert to the case where investorsare risk neutral,
so that the source of ineﬃciency studied in the previous section disappears.
The common shock is modeled as a random variable η with distribution function G(η). We
assume that, conditional on the value of η, ﬁrms’ outcomes are independent so that there is no
direct externality among ﬁrms: the eﬀort of manager k only aﬀects the probabilities of ﬁrm k’s
outcomes. For each ﬁrm k, let ρk(sk,e k,η) denote the probability of the outcome yk
sk, given the
eﬀort level ek and given a shock η. Then the probability of the joint outcome s =( s1,...,s K) given





If the shock η were observable then all the variables could be indexed by η and the argument
of Proposition 1 would continue to hold, so that a stock market equilibrium would be constrained
eﬃcient. But to make the assumption that the common shock is observable would not be in keeping
with the basic tenet of the principal-agent model that primitive states are not observable. We thus
assume that the shock η is not observable and cannot be deduced with certainty from the observed
outcomes of the ﬁrms, so that contracts cannot be directly written conditional of the value of η.
Furthermore we assume that investors and managers are symmetrically uninformed about the value
of the common shock so that their information is restricted to the knowledge of its distribution
17A simple example will clarify the relation between the model studied here and its GEI counterpart. Suppose
there is a single ﬁrm with two outcomes (yg,y b) and the eﬀort of the manager (eH or eL) inﬂuences the probability
of these outcomes: p(yg|eH)=2 /3, p(yg|eL)=1 /3. There must be at least three primitive states in a GEI model
to generate this statistical description: for example let the primitive states be (η1,η 2,η 3), each with probability
1/3, and suppose the production function inﬂuenced by eﬀort is f(η1,e H)=f(η2,e H)=yg,f (η3,e H)=yb while
f(η1,e L)=yg,f (η2,e L)=f(η3,e L)=yb. Since there are only two outcomes, there can be at most two independent
securities based on the ﬁrm’s outcomes: thus the GEI model has incomplete markets. However with two independent
securities which associate discount factors to the outcomes yg and yb, the objective function of the ﬁrm is well deﬁned
despite the incompleteness of the markets. Suppose the ﬁrm has chosen eH. Suppose security 1 with price q1 has
payoﬀ (yg,y g,0), giving the stochastic discount factor πg deﬁned by q1 =2 /3πg, and security 2 with price q2 has
payoﬀ (0,0,y b), giving πb deﬁned by q2 =1 /3πb. Then the present value of output (yg,y b,y b) with eﬀort eL would
be 1/3πgyg +2 /3πbyb, so that the present value of output can be compared in the two cases.
23function G: thus for any agent in the economy the probability of an outcome ys =( y1
s1,...,yK
sK)





As usual we will use either the notation p(s,e), or ps(e), or just ps, depending on the complexity
of the expression.
Since η is not observable, the contract of manager j will depend on the realized outputs of the
other ﬁrms since these realizations give information on the value of the common shock and, by
inference, on the likelihood that the outcome of ﬁrm j comes from a high or a low eﬀort of manager
j. The dependence of the contract of manager j on the outcome of ﬁrm k introduces a dependence
of this contract on the eﬀort of manager k, and hence an externality. A (constrained) planner will
take this externality into account, while the markets will not. Thus a stock market equilibrium is
typically not Pareto optimal. However, as we shall see, the sign of the bias is less clear than in the
previous section.
In this section we make use of the following assumptions on the characteristics of the economy:
B1. The utility functions (vk)k∈K of managers are diﬀerentiable, increasing, strictly concave,
and vk(c) →− ∞as c → 0, for all k ∈ K.





k∈K ρk(sk,e k,η)dG(η), for some distribution function G.




is an increasing function of sk.





sk>α} ρk(sk,e k,η)i sa
concave, increasing function of ek.




is an increasing function of sk.




is a decreasing function of η.
B3 deﬁnes the probability structure: ﬁrms’ outcomes are aﬀected by the common shock η but,
conditional on the value of η, their outcomes are independent random variables. B4 and B5 are the
standard properties assumed in the principal-agent model, namely the monotone likelihood ratio
24property and stochastic decreasing returns to eﬀort, which are assumed to hold for every value of
the common shock. B6 is the condition which ensures that a higher value of η is favorable to high
outcomes: it is equivalent to the property that, if η>η 0, the ratio of the likelihood of yk
sk with η
to the likelihood of yk











increases with sk. B7 is an assumption on the interaction between the eﬀect of managerial eﬀort
and the common shock: it is equivalent to the property that, for ek >e 0













decreases with η. The shock and eﬀort are in essence substitutes since increasing η decreases the
likelihood that yk
sk can be attributed to a high rather than a low eﬀort. If η were observable, the
compensation of manager k would decrease as η increases. When η is not observable but B6 holds,
the outcomes of ﬁrms j 6= k give information on the likelihood that η has been high or low, and
this leads to a monotone dependence of manager k’s compensation on the outcomes of other ﬁrms
j 6= k. We say that manager k’s compensation τk(sk,s −k) is decreasing in s−k if for all pairs of
outcomes s−k =( sj)j6=k and ˜ s−k =( ˜ sj)j6=k, with sj ≥ ˜ sj for all j 6= k and at least one strict
inequality, τk(sk,s −k) <τ k(sk,˜ s−k).
Lemma 1. Under the assumptions B1-B7, if (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e,¯ π) is an interior stock market equilibrium ,
then for any k ∈ K and sk ∈ Sk, the contract ¯ τk(sk,s −k) is decreasing in s−k.
The proof is given in Magill-Quinzii (2006), as well as examples which do and do not satisfy B7.
Assumption B7 is satisﬁed when the probability ρk(sk,e k,η) depends additively on ek and η.
Proposition 4 summarizes the results that can be obtained on the sign of ∂ ¯ L
∂ek at an equilibrium.
Proposition 4. (i) Let B1-B5 be satisﬁed. If (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π) is an interior stock market equilibrium,










































s > 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀k ∈ K (16)
then Dk < 0 and Ik > 0.
Proof: (i) Let (¯ x, ¯ τ,¯ e, ¯ π) be an interior stock market equilibrium. Under Assumptions B1-B5 the
ﬁrst order approach is valid and let (¯ λ, ¯ β, ¯ µ) be the multipliers associated with the equilibrium for
which (FOC)E hold. Since investors are risk neutral we can assume that ¯ πs = 1 for all s ∈ S and
¯ αi = 1
¯ λi = 1 for all i ∈ I. Since at the equilibrium the FOC for optimal eﬀort, (iii) of (FOC)E,i s
satisﬁed for each ﬁrm it follows that







































s − ¯ τj
s), for all



































= 0. It follows that



























s) and using equation (ii) in (FOC)E with
¯ πs = 1, gives the decomposition










































































(ii) Let us assume B1-B7 and show that we can sign Dj,k and Ij,k.
Sign of Dj,k: Since ajvj + bj for aj > 0 represents the same preferences for manager j as vj
and since the consumption vector ¯ τj
s is bounded, we can assume without loss of generality that
bj is chosen such that (16) holds. As we saw in the proof of Proposition 3, x → vj(x) − v0(x)x





s is decreasing in sk. Since 1 =
 








j is decreasing, ¯ τj
s




decreasing in sk. Thus the product
Hj(sk,s −k)=




























The monotone likelihood ratio condition B4 implies that if ek >e 0
k the distribution function gen-
erated by ρ(sk,e k,η) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution function generated by
ρ(sk,e 0





< 0 since Hj(sk,s −k) is decreasing
in sk. Thus Dj,k < 0.
































is a density function for the measure dG(η). Let Ga denote the dis-
27tribution function induced by the density a with respect to dG. The integral (18) is the expectation










+c o v a(Lj,L k)









is the sign of the covariance term. By B7
the random variables Lj and Lk are decreasing functions of η, and are thus positively dependent
random variables with respect to dGa. This in turn implies that cova(Lj,L k) is positive (see e.g.
Magill-Quinzii (1996, p.170)). 2
The general principle underlying an incentive contract is that the agent undertaking the eﬀort
should be paid more when the realized outcome is more likely to have occurred with high eﬀort,
and should be paid less when the outcome is more likely with low eﬀort. When outcomes are the
combined result of eﬀort and a common shock—and when the shock is not observable but also
aﬀects other ﬁrms—then the realized outcomes of these other ﬁrms provide information on the
shock, and this in turn provides information on the likelihood that a given outcome for the ﬁrm is
due to high or low eﬀort on the part of its manager: this point was emphasized by Holmstrom (1982)
and Mookherjee (1984). Since the outcomes of other ﬁrms are also inﬂuenced by the eﬀort of their
managers, the fact that observed outcomes are used to infer information about the unobservable
common shock introduces a dependence between the eﬀort of manager k and the compensation of
manager j 6= k. The contract of manager k in equilibrium only takes into account the eﬀect of
his eﬀort on the expected proﬁt of the ﬁrm and his expected utility, but ignores its eﬀect on the
compensation, and hence the expected utility, of the managers of the other ﬁrms. Proposition 4
can be interpreted as a description of the two additional eﬀects that a planner would take into
account when deciding on the eﬀort to induce from manager k.
The ﬁrst, Dk =
P
j6=k Dj,k, which we call the direct eﬀect, is similar to the diﬀerence (14)
studied in the proof of Proposition 3, the welfare diﬀerence terms being restricted to the managers
other than k since the investors are risk neutral. Dk expresses the diﬀerence between the eﬀects
of a marginal change ∆ek in manager k’s eﬀort on the weighted expected utility of the other
managers—which would enter the objective of the planner—and on the weighted market value of
their consumption—which enters in the objective of proﬁt maximization. As in Remark 5, since




s is increasing in τj
s when τj
s > 0. When B6 and
B7 hold, Lemma 1 implies that τj(sk,s −k) is decreasing in sk and, as we have seen in the proof,
αj(sk,s −k) is also decreasing in sk. Thus by an argument similar to that in Remark 5, but this
28time with a decreasing function, decreasing the eﬀort ek of manager k shifts probability towards
lower values of sk and hence increases the weighted expected utility of consumption of manager j
more than it increases the market value of his consumption.
The second eﬀect which the planner would take into account is that the eﬀort of manager k




, and hence the informativeness of the outcomes of other
ﬁrms. When Assumption B7 holds, an increase ∆ek in manager k’s eﬀort increases the likelihood
of high outcomes for ﬁrm k. As a result a high value of yk becomes a less informative signal of
the value of η and the the outcome yj becomes more informative on the value of ej so that the
welfare of manager j in the social welfare function increases. Since this eﬀect occurs through the
likelihood ratio, or the information that can be inferred from a given realization of ﬁrm j, we call
it the information eﬀect.
Example. The following example, which satisﬁes Assumptions B1-B7, is instructive for studying
which of the two eﬀects dominates, i.e. whether there is under or over-provision of eﬀort at equi-
librium. Let K =2 ,S1 = {g1,b 1},S 2 = {g2,b 2}, S = S1 × S2, vk(c)=
1
1 − α
c1−α, 0 <α6= 1, and
let the probabilities be aﬃne in eﬀort and the shock
ρk(gk,e k,η)=ak + bkek + dη, 0 <a k + bk + d<1,ρ k(bk,e k,η)=1− ρk(gk,e k,η),k =1 ,2
where η is uniformly distributed on [0,1] and the cost functions c1(e1), and c2(e2) are such that e1
and e2 always lie in (0,1), i.e. ck(0) = 0, ck(ek) →∞as ek → 1.













as a function of d, which parameterizes the impact of
the common shock η on the probabilities.
To compute an equilibrium we need in addition to specify the outputs yk =( yk
gk,yk
bk)o ft h et w o
29ﬁrms (k =1 ,2), the outside options (ν1,ν 2) and the cost functions (c1,c 2) of the two managers.
However since the expression (17) that we want to study only depends indirectly on these char-
acteristics through the resulting equilibrium values (¯ ek, ¯ βk, ¯ µk),k=1 ,2 , it is more convenient to
study (17) by treating the equilibrium values as parameters. For once (ak,b k,d,¯ ek, ¯ βk, ¯ µk),k=1 ,2
have been chosen, there exist characteristics (yk,ν k,c k),k =1 ,2, consumption streams, contracts















0 ρ1(s1,¯ e1,η)ρ2(s2,¯ e2,η)dη. Calculating
∂ ¯ L
∂ej
,j=1 ,2, and varying the parameters
(α,a,b,d,)(¯ e, ¯ β,¯ µ), we ﬁnd that the typical graph of
∂ ¯ L
∂ej
as a function of d—the coeﬃcent which
measures the magnitude of the impact of the shock η on the probability of the outcomes of each
ﬁrm—has the form shown in Figure18 2.
When there is no common shock (d = 0) the equilibrium is eﬃcient. For small magnitudes of d,
the direct externality eﬀect dominates and
∂ ¯ L
∂ej
is negative: managers over invest in eﬀort. When
d is suﬃciently large, the information eﬀect—which, as we saw in the proof of Proposition 4, is
a positive covariance term between two random variables jointly inﬂuenced by η—becomes strong
enough to dominate. To the extent that in practice the outcomes (proﬁts) of ﬁrms are often strongly
correlated, it seems natural within the framework of this model to adopt a relatively large value of




positive, the eﬀect of risk aversion when combined with that of a common
unobservable shock seems likely to lead to under-provision of eﬀort in equilibrium, in the sense of
Proposition 2.
6. Continuum of Firms
Mostmodels of general equilibrium with moralhazard in which, as in this paper, eﬀort inﬂuences
the probability of the outcomes, make the assumption that there is a continuum of agents of each
type with independent shocks (Prescott-Townsend (1984a), (1984b), Kocherlakota (1998), Lisboa
(2001)). The papers just cited reach the conclusion that an equilibrium is CPO, while we show
that typically a stock market equilibrium is not CPO. Thus it is instructive to see what happens
18Figure 2 uses the following values of the parameters: a =( 0 .25,0.25),b=( 0 .2,0.2),α =0 .5, ¯ e =( 0 .2,0.2), ¯ β1 =
100, ¯ µ1 = 50.
30in our model if we replicate the ﬁrms and, in the limit, have a continuum of ﬁrms of each type. We
will not write out the details of the model for the continuum case, but rather indicate, using the
structure of our model, why the ineﬃciencies studied in Sections 4 and 5 disappear when there is
a continuum of ﬁrms of each type.
Consider ﬁrst the model of Section 4 and let us change the model by assuming that k ∈ K
represents a type of ﬁrm and that there is a continuum of mass 1 of identical ﬁrms of each type.
We assume that the probabilities of the outcomes of any two ﬁrms (whether of the same or of
diﬀerent types) are independent, and that ﬁrms of the same type k have identical managers (same
(vk,ν k,p k)). Assuming that all the managers of the same type are oﬀered the same contract
and choose the same eﬀort, in equilibrium as well as in the planner’s problem, the probabilities
pk(sk,e k),s k ∈ Sk of the outcomes of ﬁrms of type k become the proportion of ﬁrms of this type
with output sk, so that the total output
P
sk pk(sk,e k)yk
sk of the ﬁrms of type k is non-random,
and increases with ek. The continuum of ﬁrms eliminates risk and thus the eﬀect of risk aversion
studied in Section 4. Another way of explaining the result is to note that the trade-oﬀ between
the cost of providing incentives and the probability of good outcomes faced by an individual ﬁrm
becomes, at the aggregate level, a trade-oﬀ between cost of incentives and quantity of output, and
the marginal value of output is correctly evaluated by the market.
For the model of Section 5 with a common shock, satisfying the assumptions B1-B7, consider
adding a continuum of ﬁrms of each type k ∈ K, assuming that the probabilities of the outcomes
of any two ﬁrms are independent conditional on the value of η. The continuum removes the
idiosyncratic shocks of ﬁrms from the aggregate: since the optimal eﬀort ek of a representative
manager can be deduced from the incentive contract of ﬁrms of type k, and since the proportion
of the ﬁrms with output sk can be observed, the probabilities ρ(sk,e k,η) can be inferred, and from
this the value of η can be deduced. Thus the continuum in essence transforms the unobservable η
into an observable or inferrable η, and this solves the information problem without introducing an
externality. Given Assumption B6 which implies that if η>η 0 the distribution function induced by




sk of the ﬁrms of type k is an increasing function of η. Thus the
optimal contract for the representative manager of a type k ﬁrm when η is known can equivalently
be expressed as a contract which depends on the total output of the ﬁrms of type k or the economy-
wide aggregate output. Thus even if there is a common shock, if there is a continuum of ﬁrms of
each type and investors are risk neutral, a stock market equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal.
In Sections 4 and 5 we have separated the eﬀect of risk aversion and the informational problem
31induced by the unobservability of the common shock. In the case where there is a common shock
and investors are risk averse, constrained Pareto optimality will be obtained with a continuum of
ﬁrms if there are appropriate markets which permit the aggregate risk induced by η to be optimally
shared.
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